The Economics of School Choice by Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Economics of School Choice
Volume Author/Editor: Caroline M. Hoxby, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-35533-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/hox03-1
Conference Date: February 22-24, 2001
Publication Date: January 2003
Title: School Vouchers as a Redistributive Device. An Analysis
of Three Alternative Systems
Author: Raquel Fernandez, Richard Rogerson
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c100896.1 Introduction
Two broad movements can be identiﬁed in the public policy debates over
ﬁnancing and provision of K-12 education. The ﬁrst movement began in
the early 1970s with the landmark ruling by the California Supreme Court
that found California’s system of ﬁnancing public K-12 education to be un-
constitutional. This movement sought to bring about greater equality in
educational opportunities by reducing disparities in spending per student
across communities. The main method used to accomplish this was chang-
ing the rules used by states to redistribute funding across districts. The sec-
ond movement began in the 1980s and was largely an outgrowth from a col-
lective sense that the quality of public K-12 education in the United States
was low, especially in lower-income neighborhoods. This second movement
has advocated increasing the choice of schools available to students with the
hope of increasing competition across schools and enhancing eﬃciency.
An important theme in our previous research has been the observation
that parents’ inability to borrow against the future income of their children
(to allow them to, say, move to a neighborhood with better schools) may re-
sult in ineﬃciently low investment in the human capital of children from
poorer families in a quantitatively signiﬁcant manner (see, e.g., Fernández
and Rogerson 1996, 1997, 1998). We will refer to this as the imperfect cap-
ital markets perspective on school ﬁnancing. School choice also relates to
this market failure, because policies that facilitate the access of lower-
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ciency of schools in low-income neighborhoods will also raise the human
capital investment in children of poorer families.
Redistribution and other policies that promote greater access to high-
quality schools can therefore be seen as operating to overcome similar prob-
lems. The school choice movement, though, on the whole tends to stress the
potential ineﬃciencies that arise from the provision of school services in a
system with a public monopoly (see, e.g., Hoxby 2000). The capital markets
approach stresses the unequal educational opportunities individuals may
face as a consequence of parental income and imperfect capital markets.
It is important to note that even if schools functioned eﬃciently, as long
as they responded to parental income either as a result of local funding
(with wealthier parents living in wealthier communities able to fund higher-
quality schools) or as a result of proﬁt maximization on the part of private
schools (with higher-quality schools charging higher prices), then the in-
eﬃciency associated with imperfect markets would remain. The objective of
this chapter is to examine the consequences of this source of market failure
by abstracting away from ineﬃcient provision per se. We do this by assum-
ing that all schools are private and operate in a competitive market. Conse-
quently, the provision of these services is eﬃcient, in the sense that a dollar
of education expenditures can buy the same services regardless of family in-
come, holding other potential inputs constant.
We examine the consequences of several voucher programs that serve to
redistribute income in a manner that aﬀects the distribution of the quality
of education across students. We consider three voucher programs: a lump-
sum voucher program in which all households are given a voucher of equal
value, a means-tested voucher program in which all households below some
threshold are given a voucher of equal value, and a “means-equalizing”
voucher program, which gives all households below some income a voucher
that depends both on their income and the amount of their funds they de-
vote to education. Because the ineﬃciency associated with imperfect capi-
tal markets is dynamic—there exist proﬁtable investments that are not un-
dertaken because of ﬁnancing constraints—we examine the consequences
of these diﬀerent education ﬁnance systems in a dynamic framework. By re-
lating quality of education to future earnings, our framework allows us to
analyze the eﬀects of voucher programs on the distribution of income, in
both the short and the long run. We can also evaluate the dynamic welfare
consequences of these programs. Our main ﬁnding is that voucher pro-
grams can have a large positive impact on income and welfare.
Our analysis concludes with the consideration of endogenously deter-
mined parameters in each of the voucher programs. We do this by allowing
the speciﬁcation of the voucher system to be determined by a process of ma-
jority vote. Here we ﬁnd that the outcomes vary quite widely across systems.
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ution relative to the two other systems we analyze.
6.2 Benchmark Model
An analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent voucher systems is a complex un-
dertaking. Parents can diﬀer in their preferences, education levels, number
of children, and marital status. Children can diﬀer in ability, temperament,
and family background. Here we choose to abstract away from these po-
tentially important elements to better focus attention on the short- and
long-run consequences of the redistribution implicit in alternative voucher
systems.
In this section we describe the model that will serve as a benchmark in our
analysis. Our benchmark model is chosen with an eye toward the objective
of our analysis as outlined in the introduction. In particular, it is common
in current policy debates for proponents of voucher programs to argue that
one of the positive eﬀects of vouchers is to increase competition in the pro-
vision of educational services and hence raise eﬃciency. Although we be-
lieve this may be one of the important consequences of voucher programs
in the context of the current institutional context, our objective here is to ar-
gue that even in a world in which provision of educational services is eﬃ-
cient, the potential for vouchers to redistribute educational resources is also
economically important. With this in mind, our benchmark model is one in
which educational services are provided eﬃciently to all families, but there
is a complete absence of other mechanisms in place that serve to transfer
educational resources across families.
One interpretation of this benchmark corresponds to the well-known
Tiebout model of local public good provision. In this model, education ser-
vices are provided at the local level and are ﬁnanced entirely by local taxa-
tion, and individuals sort themselves perfectly into communities. A second
interpretation is that there is no public provision of education services, but
there is a private market in which all individuals purchase educational ser-
vices. In both interpretations, of course, the assumption of eﬃcient provi-
sion of education services is maintained.1
Regardless of which interpretation one adopts, it should be clear that the
benchmark is not an attempt to model the current state of education ﬁnance
and provision in the United States, although the ﬁrst interpretation does
capture some of its elements. In particular, although the existing system in
the United States does involve local provision of education, it is not entirely
ﬁnanced at the local level. Most states have systems of education ﬁnance
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1. Note that what matters for our results is not that the provision of education is eﬃcient but,
rather, that the degree of ineﬃciency is invariant to the voucher programs analyzed.that eﬀectively transfer some resources from wealthier districts to less
wealthy districts, although the extent to which this happens varies from
state to state. Another feature of reality is that local revenues come largely
from the taxation of property, whereas the state-level resources tend to
come from the taxation of income or consumption. Also, although there is
sorting of individuals across communities, the sorting is much less than per-
fect.2Finally, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the eﬃciency with
which educational services are provided varies widely across schools and
communities.
The beneﬁt of our simpliﬁed setting is that it allows us to focus on the re-
distributive role of vouchers without concerning ourselves with how diﬀer-
ent redistributive programs may aﬀect one another or with the complex
interactions among these programs, housing prices, preferences, and
incomes. Although a fully developed analysis of the impact of a voucher
program should incorporate all these elements, we think that such a bench-
mark is too diﬃcult an undertaking and that a more computational ap-
proach would obscure some of the more salient features of the workings of
a voucher program. A word of caution is warranted, however: To the extent
that the current system of ﬁnance does involve some redistribution, one
should not interpret our results as indicating that vouchers are required to
provide redistribution. We note, however, that there is an important dis-
tinction between redistributing using vouchers versus redistributing in the
existing framework of school ﬁnance. Vouchers are targeted to individuals,
whereas interdistrict redistribution is targeted to districts. Because of im-
perfect sorting of families across districts, redistribution across districts is
likely to be less eﬀective in transferring funds to poor individuals. However,
perhaps precisely because of this feature, vouchers may be less eﬀective
when endogenously determined than a system of transfers across districts.
We next turn to a description of the formal structure of the model and of
our choice of functional forms and parameter values to be used in the quan-
titative analysis in subsequent sections. Our choice of parameter values,
such as fraction of income devoted to education, is guided by data for the
U.S. economy over the last forty or so years. We have also conducted an ex-
tensive sensitivity analysis and found our main ﬁndings to be robust to what
would be viewed as large deviations in these values, so the reader should not
be overly worried about disagreements in the literature about the exact val-
ues of these numbers.
Following Fernández and Rogerson (1997, 1998), we consider the fol-
lowing structure. At any point in time there are a large number of families,
each of which (for simplicity) is assumed to consist of one adult and one
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2. For example, Epple and Sieg (1999) analyze communities within the Boston metropolitan
area and ﬁnd that sorting according to income is very imperfect. See Fernández (2002) for a
review of the literature on sorting, education, and inequality.child. One period later, the adult will be deceased and hence leave the
model, whereas the child will be in the period of adult life in which he or she
heads a family that also has one child. The only distinction between fami-
lies is that they diﬀer in their level of income, which we denote by y. In each
period a family has one decision to make: how to allocate its income be-
tween expenditures on consumption and expenditures on the child’s edu-
cation. We assume that parents make all the decisions and have identical
preferences over current consumption and their child’s future income de-
scribed by
(1) u(c)   Ez(y ),
where c is the household’s consumption in the current period and y  is next
period’s income of the household’s child. We include the expectations op-
erator E in front of the function z(y ) because, as we will see shortly, the
child’s future income is stochastic viewed from the perspective of the cur-
rent period. In general, we assume that the two functions u and z are in-
creasing and concave. The essence of our preference speciﬁcation is to say
that parents care about both their standard of living and the expected stan-
dard of living that their children will attain. To simplify matters we assume
that parents use the future income of their children as a proxy for the stan-
dard of living that they will attain.
In the ﬁrst period of life, the child attends school and obtains the quality
of education q. In the second period, the now old child receives a draw from
the income distribution. This income draw depends on the quality of
schooling the child received when young and an independently and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) shock   whose distribution  ( ) is assumed to be in-
dependent of q. Thus, y  f(q,  ). In adopting this speciﬁcation we are as-
suming that although there is a link between quality of education and future
income, the link is not perfect. There are a number of additional factors,
which we assume to be random, that will also aﬀect the ultimate level of in-
come that one achieves. These factors could include how one gets along
with one’s superiors, landing a good ﬁrst job, or working for a company that
becomes very successful.
Calibrating the model requires choosing an education production func-
tion. Unfortunately, there is very little consensus on the form the latter
should take; indeed, a large and controversial literature surrounds this
topic. Guided primarily by simplicity, a convenient speciﬁcation is
y  Aq  ,
which yields an elasticity of future income with respect to education qual-
ity that is constant and equal to  : That is, for every percent increase in the
quality of education, future earnings will increase by   percent. We assume
that  is lognormally distributed such that log  has zero mean and standard
deviation   .
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school quality. There is a substantial amount of work that suggests that
many schools do not use resources eﬀectively. Moreover, one of the chief
motivations for the school choice proponents is that increased choice will
spur competition and hence lead to more eﬃcient use of resources in pro-
viding education services. As discussed previously, in order to focus our
analysis on the ﬁnance side of school choice, we have chosen to examine the
role for redistributional ﬁnance in a world in which educational resources
are used eﬃciently. In addition to school resources, it is also plausible that
peer eﬀects and parental attributes also matter.3To focus the analysis on the
diﬀerent incentives associated with alternative voucher schemes, we assume
that peer eﬀects and parental attributes do not aﬀect school quality. We also
assume that there are no scale eﬀects in providing education. Hence, in the
analysis that follows we will assume that spending on education and qual-
ity of education are in fact synonymous.
Evidence presented by Card and Krueger (1992), Wachtel (1976), and
Johnson and Staﬀord (1973) suggests an elasticity of earnings with respect
to education expenditures close to 0.2. This analysis would suggest that we
set   0.2 in our benchmark speciﬁcation. One potentially problematic is-
sue with this procedure is that it abstracts from the potential ineﬃcient use
of resources. An alternative approach to calibrating the value of the pa-
rameter   is to target a rate of return to spending on education. A large vol-
ume of empirical work suggests that the rate of return to spending on edu-
cation lies in the range of 5 to 15 percent. In our model this return will vary
with the level of spending, but it turns out that a value of   0.2 implies a
rate of return that varies from 4 to 11 percent depending on an individual’s
spending (and hence income).4In view of this we think the choice of   0.2
is a reasonable one.
The adult’s decision is a choice of the fraction of income to spend on con-
sumption relative to the child’s education. In formulating this decision it is
convenient to deﬁne w(q)  ∫0
∞z(f(q,  ))d . The function w(q) represents the
expected utility that a parent receives from spending qdollars on the child’s
education. We can now write the decision problem facing a parent as one of
choosing how to allocate income y between c and q so as to maximize
U(c,q)   u(c)   w(q)
Not surprisingly, the consequences of various redistributive programs
will depend upon the income and substitution eﬀects implicit in the utility
function U. It is thus instructive to ask whether there are some reasonable
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3. Several authors have studied peer eﬀects. See de Bartolome (1990) for a survey of the em-
pirical literature and a theoretical model incorporating peer eﬀects. See also Benabou (1993,
1996), Durlauf (1996), Epple and Romano (1996, 1998), and Caucutt (2002) for other studies
incorporating peer eﬀects.
4. See Fernández and Rogerson (1997), table 5, for more detail.restrictions that can be placed upon preferences in order to discriminate
among the many possible speciﬁcations. As is true in many other contexts,
we think that longer-run evidence provides some important information to
guide choices. Fernández and Rogerson (2001) show that across the United
States the share of personal income devoted to public elementary and sec-
ondary education has remained roughly constant over the 1970–90 period
at the same time that income per capita almost doubled. This property will
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for some parameter values   and b together with the restriction that       
and B   bE(  ). In the analysis that follows, we impose these preferences
and assume as well that   is nonpositive.
Having chosen the functional form for preferences, we must assign val-
ues to b and  . Given values for all the other parameters, there is a mono-
tone relationship between band the fraction of income an individual would
choose to devote to education. In our benchmark model we choose a value
of b so that this fraction equals 0.041, which is roughly the fraction of ag-
gregate income devoted to K-12 education in the United States over the last
forty years. This requires b to be given by b   {[(1 – t∗)/t∗] –1}/[A E(  )],
where t∗   0.041 is the fraction of income devoted to education. Choosing
a value of   is somewhat more diﬃcult. Fernández and Rogerson (1999a)
survey several diﬀerent approaches to picking this value and conclude that
values in the range of [–2, 0] are most reasonable. We choose   –1 for our
benchmark model.
In order to analyze the model described above, we need to specify an ini-
tial distribution of income. We denote the initial period by period 0 and let
the initial income distribution be described by a density function denoted
by g0(y). Letting gt(y) be the income distribution of old individuals in pe-
riod t, an equilibrium generates an income distribution for period t   1,
gt 1. Denote this mapping from the income distribution of a given period
into the income distribution of the next period by the function F[g(y)]. A
steady state in this model is given by a distribution of income for the next
generation that is the same as the distribution of income for the current gen-
eration. Note that this does not presume that each child will have the same
income as the parent. Because income when old contains a random ele-
ment, this will not be the case. Rather, in a steady state, for each individ-
ual whose income is greater than that of his or her parent, there is another
individual who experiences the opposite movement, and vice versa. Of
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income, there will be a positive correlation between a parent’s income this
period and the child’s income next period. From a formal perspective, a
steady state in this model then consists of an income distribution g∗(y) such
that g∗(y)   F[g∗(y)]. In the analysis of alternative voucher systems that
follows, we will take the starting position of the economy to be the steady
state for the model just described. We will be interested in solving for the
steady states of the model with diﬀerent voucher schemes as well as exam-
ining the transition path to these steady states.
The ﬁnal element of the calibration exercise that remains concerns two
parameters of the educational production function: A, the constant term in
front of the production function, and   , the standard deviation of the idio-
syncratic income shock. Intuitively, the larger the value of A, the greater we
expect everyone’s income to be next period, because it implies a higher ex-
pected value of income for any given level of spending on education. The
larger the value of   , the more spread out we expect income to be, because
this variable determines the spread of the random component of income. If
this parameter were set to zero, then children’s incomes would be perfectly
determined by their educational expenditures.
Given the functional forms described above, one can show that the
steady-state distribution of income in the benchmark model is also lognor-
mally distributed, with mean and standard deviation determined by the val-
ues of A and   . To see this, consider the decision problem solved by a par-
ticular individual with income yi. Let tibe the fraction of income devoted to
education. Then, they solve the following problem:
(4) max
ti
u[(1 – ti)yi]   w(tiyi)
Thus, each individual’s value for ti is given by the ﬁrst-order condition
(5) –u [yi(1 – ti)]   w (tiyi)   0
Note that equation (5) has individuals set spending on education to equate
the marginal utility of consumption with the marginal utility of education
quality—that is, u (c)   w (q).
It is then easy to solve for the dynamic evolution of the economy. One
can show that the preferences specified in equation (2) imply a constant
and identical value of ti across individuals, t∗   1/(1    ), where   
(bA E(  ))1/(  – 1). That is, all individuals spend the same fraction of their in-
come on education. To solve for the dynamics of the system, note that if a
parent’s income in period 0 is y0, the child’s income, y1, is given by log y1  
log A   log t∗   log y0   log  1. Given   1, it follows that log yt has a
limiting distribution that is normal with mean and standard deviation
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data over the last forty years. Speciﬁcally, we match the mean and median
of the U.S. family income distribution as measured in the 1980 census, re-
spectively 23.1 and 19.9, measured in thousands of dollars.
A key feature of our benchmark model is that the educational expendi-
tures for a given child must be ﬁnanced out of the income of the parent. In
particular, we are ruling out the possibility that a parent or a child could
borrow against the child’s future income in order to have greater expendi-
ture on education when young. We believe this is the most natural assump-
tion to make in the context of K-12 education, but we wish to stress it be-
cause of its importance to our analysis.
We next turn to the determination of the distribution of education ex-
penditures across individuals under diﬀerent voucher systems.
6.3 Voucher Programs
In this section we describe three diﬀerent types of voucher programs. We
focus on the outcomes for the distribution of education expenditures
achieved in a given period under each of the voucher systems taking the ini-
tial income distribution as given.
6.3.1 A Lump-Sum Voucher System
In this section we consider a voucher system that we refer to as a lump-
sum voucher system. Under this system all households receive a voucher of
size  l, which they can use only to fund expenditures on education. They
are, however, free to spend more than this amount by supplementing this
voucher with their own funds.
For any system, we need to describe how the voucher is ﬁnanced. We as-
sume that this is achieved by proportional (income) taxation at rate  l. Re-
quiring the budget to be balanced in every period, we obtain
(7)  l    l y,
where  y is mean income in the economy. In this section we assume that the
size of the voucher is ﬁxed over time, and hence omit time subscripts to sim-
plify notation.
Consider the choices facing an individual parent in an economy that
oﬀers this type of voucher program. Letting tidenote the fraction of income
that individual i devotes to education over and above the voucher level, we
have
(8) ci   (1 – ti –  l)yl
qi    l   tiyi
Note that because of the balanced budget requirement the voucher pro-
gram in a given period is eﬀectively summarized by one parameter, either




u[(1 – ti –  l)yi]   w( l   tiyi), ti   0,
yielding the ﬁrst-order condition
(10) –u [(1 – ti –  l)yi]   w ( l   tiyi)   0,
with strict equality for ti   0.
With the restriction on preferences described earlier, one can show that
the values of the ti are increasing in yi. Moreover, there will be some cutoﬀ
value of y, which we call y ˆl, such that all individuals with y y ˆlchoose ti 0;
that is, all households with income below y ˆlhave spending on education that
is exactly equal to the size of the voucher. Furthermore, the level of this cu-
toﬀ value is increasing in the size of the voucher. These results are intuitive.
The voucher provides a minimum value of spending on education. If this
level is suﬃciently large it will exceed the amount that the lowest-income
families wish to spend on education (at a marginal cost of yi), and hence they
may choose not to devote any additional funds to education. Of course, fam-
ilies with more income may still wish to increase their education expendi-
tures. The larger the size of the voucher, the greater the number of families
that will choose not to spend any additional resources on education.
We can also say something about how this program aﬀects the distribu-
tion of education expenditures across the income distribution. For ex-
ample, it is easy to show that anyone who chooses ti   0 will have a larger
expenditure on education under this lump-sum voucher system than in the
benchmark model. More generally, one can show that there exists some
level of income y   y ˆlsuch that everyone below this value spends more than
in the benchmark model and everyone above this level will end up spending
less than in the benchmark model.
The properties of this system come from noting that in a system of pro-
portional taxation, all households with income less than mean income pay
less in taxes than the value of the voucher they receive. This induces house-
holds with income less than mean income to increase their spending on ed-
ucation relative to the benchmark model. The same reasoning does not hold
for individuals with income above the mean, because the voucher on net re-
distributes income away from them. Of course, if the voucher level is set
suﬃciently high—say, higher than the maximum amount being spent by
anyone in the benchmark model—then spending on education by everyone
would increase.
It follows that a lump-sum voucher system tends to compress the distri-
bution of educational expenditures, and (for any voucher amount below the
maximum spending on education observed in the benchmark system) this
compression will come about both by raising spending at the bottom of the
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see later that the extent of compression from above turns out to be quite
small quantitatively, so that the primary eﬀect is to generate compression
from below.
6.3.2 A Means-Tested Voucher
In this subsection we describe a second voucher system, which we refer
to as a means-tested voucher. This system is similar to the lump-sum
voucher but diﬀers in one feature. Rather than assuming that all families
receive a voucher of value vm, we now assume that the voucher is received
only by those households that have income below some cutoﬀlevel denoted
by ym. As before, households are free to supplement the voucher if they
wish to spend more on education, but the voucher must be used only for
spending on education. As above, the voucher program is ﬁnanced by a
proportional tax on income, and the budget is assumed to balance in each
period.
The mechanics of this voucher system are quite similar to that described
above. The problem faced by a household with income less than the means-
tested cutoﬀ ym is now
(11) max
ti
u[(1 – ti –  m)yi]   w( m   tiyi), ti   0,
yielding the ﬁrst-order condition
(12) –u [(1 – ti –  m)yi]yi   w ( m   tiyi)yi   0,
with strict equality for ti   0.
On the other hand, an individual with income that lies above the means-
tested cutoﬀ ym faces the problem of
(13) max
ti
u[(1 – ti –  m)yi]   w(tiyi), ti   0,
yielding the ﬁrst-order condition
(14) –u [(1 – ti –  m)yi]yi   w (tiyi)yi   0,
with strict equality for ti   0.
Assuming that ym is binding (i.e., some households are not eligible), a
voucher of the same size as in the lump-sum system (i.e.,  t   m) will require
a smaller tax to ﬁnance it because not all households are receiving the
voucher.
Several basic results follow easily. Relative to the benchmark model, all
households that have income above the means-tested cutoﬀ will now spend
less on education. This is entirely because the tax to support the voucher
plan reduces their after-tax income. As in the case of the lump-sum voucher
system, even conditional on receiving a voucher, a given household’s spend-
ing on education may either increase or decrease. However, any household
School Vouchers as a Redistributive Device 205that receives the voucher and has income below mean income will neces-
sarily spend more on education.
As above, we conclude that this type of voucher system will also tend to
compress the distribution of educational spending. Once again, however,
we will see in the quantitative work that the compression from above tends
to be quite small.
6.3.3 A Means-Equalizing Voucher
Lastly, we turn to an analysis of another voucher that depends on indi-
vidual characteristics, which we refer to as a means-equalizing voucher sys-
tem. Like the previous case, this system excludes individuals with income
greater than some prespeciﬁed level, but it avoids a troubling aspect of the
previous system. In particular, in the means-tested voucher system two fam-
ilies with very similar incomes but that fall on opposite sides of the means-
tested cutoﬀ level will be treated very diﬀerently—one of them receives a
potentially signiﬁcant transfer, whereas the other receives nothing. To avoid
this type of discontinuity in the value of the voucher, the means-equalizing
system presents individuals with a voucher payment that depends both on
their income and on the fraction of their income devoted to education. In
particular, as we explain in more detail below, this voucher plan will guar-
antee that a poor family that devotes a certain fraction of its budget to ed-
ucation will end up with the same level of total educational expenditure as
a richer family that devotes the same fraction of its budget to educational
expenditures. The term “means-equalizing” is used because this voucher
guarantees that families that devote the same fraction of their income to ed-
ucation will end up with equal educational expenditures, thus equalizing
their means in terms of generating education expenditure through a given
tax eﬀort. There are, of course, many ways to alter the means-tested
voucher system in order to remove the discontinuity, but we focus on this
one because it has parallels with many redistributive tax programs and it
has a close analogue in the school ﬁnance system literature. Another aspect
of this voucher system that diﬀers from those considered previously is that
in this system the size of the voucher is dependent on the actions of the fam-
ily. In particular, a family that devotes no resources to education expendi-
tures is not eligible for a voucher, independent of their income.
We now describe this plan more formally. Let ye be the cutoﬀ level of in-
come in this system. Consider a household with income yi and suppose this
household chooses to devote a fraction ti of its income to education. The
voucher system is set up to guarantee all households a minimum base from
which to obtain their total expenditures on education that is given by
qi   ti max{yi, ye}
It follows that the actual voucher received by a household with income yi
that allocates a fraction ti of its income to education is given by
206 Raquel Fernández and Richard Rogerson e   max [ti(y e – yi), 0].
Obviously, anyone with income greater than the cutoﬀ level ye will not re-
ceive any voucher. Note that although the system does not guarantee any
particular level of education spending, it does provide a common base for
all individuals.
We assume, as in the previous case, that the required education funds are
generated by a state income tax,  e, so that private consumption is given by
(15) ci   (1 – ti –  e)yi
and the tax rate must satisfy the budget constraint
(16)  e y    
y ye
ti(ye – y)g(y)dy.
Once again we can characterize how this type of voucher system will
aﬀect the distribution of education expenditures relative to the benchmark
model. It is straightforward to show that any household with income
greater than the means-tested cutoﬀ ye will have lower spending on educa-
tion than in the benchmark model. Moreover, similar to the situations con-
sidered above, any individual with income below the minimum of ye and
mean income will necessarily increase his or her spending on education.
Once again, this type of voucher program serves to compress the distribu-
tion of educational expenditures.
We mentioned above that this voucher scheme has parallels in other re-
distributive programs. One such parallel is a negative income tax program
that seeks to guarantee a “reasonable” level of income for someone who sat-
isﬁes a work requirement. By way of comparison, the voucher program just
described attempts to provide everyone who devotes a speciﬁed fraction of
income to education a “reasonable” level of educational expenditures.
6.3.4 Parallels with the School Finance Literature
Before turning to an analysis of the quantitative impact of the various
voucher programs just described, we think it is useful to note some parallels
between these and several programs that are commonly studied in the liter-
ature on school ﬁnance. As noted in the introduction, the issue of redistrib-
uting resources across school districts has been prominent in public policy
discussions of education at least since the landmark Serrano decision in
California in 1971. Many states have been forced to restructure their sys-
tems of school ﬁnance as a result of court orders. The common issue raised
in all of these court cases is that children who grow up in poor school dis-
tricts (where pooris deﬁned as low property value per person) do not receive
an adequate education because of the shortage of funding. In an attempt to
deal with this situation, various types of programs have been used to redis-
tribute resources from property-rich districts to property-poor districts.
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ﬁnance in which all school districts are solely responsible for ﬁnancing their
own schools: That is, there is no redistribution across districts. As previ-
ously mentioned, this system has its parallel with our benchmark model, ex-
cept that in our model there is no longer an entity known as a school dis-
trict. Instead, each individual is solely responsible for ﬁnancing his or her
educational expenditures: That is, there is no redistribution across individ-
uals. Just as property-poor districts are at a signiﬁcant disadvantage in
terms of ﬁnancing an adequate education in the district system, in our
benchmark model it is the income-poor individuals who are at a disadvan-
tage in terms of ﬁnancing an adequate education.
One popular redistributive school ﬁnance system is what is known as a
foundation system. In this system, each district is given a ﬁxed amount of
money per student in order to help all districts ensure a minimum level of
quality. This type of system closely parallels our lump-sum voucher system,
in which all households are given a ﬁxed amount of money per child in order
to help all households aﬀord an education of some minimum level of quality.
Another popular redistributive measure is means-tested transfers to
school districts, through which all districts whose property base per student
lies beneath some cutoﬀvalue receive a given grant per student. Our means-
tested voucher is obviously the analogous program in our context.
Lastly, the Serrano ruling in California in the early 1970s prompted
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970) to devise a school ﬁnance system
known as a power-equalizing system. The basic idea underlying this system
was targeted speciﬁcally to the nature of the problem identiﬁed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court—namely, that even if families in districts with diﬀer-
ent property value per student chose to tax themselves at the same rate, the
children would end up with very diﬀerent qualities of education because a
given tax eﬀort yielded such diﬀerent revenues in diﬀerent districts. To rem-
edy this, Coons suggested a scheme whereby districts would be guaranteed
a given revenue per unit of tax eﬀort. Although such a system does not guar-
antee a given level of spending in a particular district, it does oﬀer that dis-
trict a guaranteed yield for its tax eﬀort. Obviously, our means-equalizing
voucher system is the analogue of this system.
To summarize, the issue of redistribution in the context of education ap-
pears both in a world in which education is publicly provided and children
attend district level schools and in a world in which education is privately
provided and children can attend any school subject to paying the tuition.
Many of the schemes used to redistribute in one context are likely to have
interesting counterparts in the other context as well.
6.4 Results with Exogenous Policy
In this section we examine the quantitative impact of introducing vouch-
ers of the types discussed previously. We assume that the parameters of
208 Raquel Fernández and Richard Rogersonthese voucher systems are set exogenously and contrast how various pa-
rameter values aﬀect the outcomes. Speciﬁcally, in the lump-sum voucher
plan we consider diﬀerent settings for the size of the voucher. In the case of
the power-equalizing voucher program, we consider diﬀerent levels for the
guaranteed tax base, which is also the cutoﬀlevel of income at which house-
holds qualify for some voucher. In the case of the means-tested voucher, the
program is characterized by two values: the cutoﬀ level of income that de-
termines who receives the voucher, and the value of the voucher. Because
this system is characterized by two parameters, there are obviously many
more possibilities to consider when setting parameters exogenously. To sim-
plify matters, in what follows we will report results for a particular one-
dimensional family of speciﬁcations. We will look at means-tested vouch-
ers that are introduced into the benchmark model with the following
characteristic: Let vmbe the size of voucher. Then we assume that the income
threshold is set such that all households that in the steady state of the bench-
mark model spent less than vm will be eligible for the voucher.5
Before we proceed with the results, it is of interest to ﬁrst consider some
aspects of the benchmark steady-state equilibrium, in particular the distri-
bution of educational expenditures across families. In considering the im-
pact of various voucher systems it is instructive to see the original distribu-
tion of expenditures in order to gauge the number of families that will be
directly aﬀected by a given size of voucher system. Recall that in the bench-
mark steady state all families are spending the same fraction (0.041) of their
income on education. Hence, the steady-state distribution of education
spending mimics the properties of the steady-state income distribution.
Table 6.1provides a breakdown of the income distribution of families by re-
porting the percentage that fall below certain threshold values relative to
mean income.
So, for example, if we consider a lump-sum voucher of size equal to 25
percent of average educational expenditures in the original steady state,
fewer than 2 percent of families will be directly aﬀected in the sense that the
voucher exceeds their spending in the original steady state. This is signiﬁ-
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5. This formulation obviously introduces a discrete downward jump in spending as a func-
tion of income, because those who spend  m   ε, ε   0 do not get a voucher and hence in ag-
gregate will end up having lower education spending (despite having higher income).
Table 6.1 Income Distribution of Families
Income Threshold % of Families below Threshold
0.25 × mean income 1.6
0.4 × mean income 9.72
0.5 × mean income 18.9
0.75 × mean income 44.2
Mean income 64.4cant because, as we shall see in the case of a lump-sum voucher program,
the impact of the voucher on families whose original spending exceeded the
size of the voucher is minimal. A similar point also applies to the case of the
means-tested voucher.
In what follows we will report results about both allocations and welfare,
looking at static (initial-period) eﬀects, steady-state eﬀects, and the transi-
tion. We begin by analyzing the eﬀects on allocations.
6.4.1 Allocations
Static Eﬀects
We begin our analysis by examining the static or ﬁrst-period eﬀects of the
voucher programs on education spending. Speciﬁcally, we take the income
distribution corresponding to the steady state of the benchmark model and
ask what will happen to the distribution of education expenditures in that
period if various voucher programs are introduced. In the case of the lump-
sum and the means-tested voucher systems, it is useful to measure the size
of the voucher relative to mean spending on education in the benchmark
steady state. In the case of the power-equalizing voucher, it is useful to mea-
sure the value of the cutoﬀrelative to mean income in the benchmark steady
state. We let    e represent mean spending on education in the benchmark
steady state and let    y represent mean income in the benchmark steady
state. Recall that these values are (0.0410)(23.08)  0.946 and 23.08 respec-
tively, measured in thousands of dollars. Table 6.2 reports results for each
of the three voucher systems for several cases distinguished by the magni-
tudes of the program.
The first column in each section of the table reports the size of the
voucher system, relative to mean educational spending (or mean income) in
the initial steady state. The second column reports total spending on edu-
cation, expressed as a fraction of total income (i.e., E/y). The third column
reports a measure of inequality in education spending, in particular the co-
eﬃcient of variation (c e) for the distribution of education spending, which
is the ratio of the standard deviation of education spending to average edu-
cation spending. In what follows we will use this as our measure of inequal-
ity. The ﬁnal column in each case reports the tax rate that is required to ﬁ-
nance the speciﬁed voucher system. Note that the ﬁrst row in each section
of the table corresponds to the case in which there is no voucher system and
hence simply reproduces the distribution of education spending in the orig-
inal steady state.
A few basic patterns emerge. In each case as the magnitude of the voucher
system is increased we see an increase in the fraction of income devoted to
education and a decrease in the inequality of education expenditures. These
qualitative results are really not that surprising. One of the key impacts of
both voucher systems is to raise expenditures on education at the bottom of
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and decreases inequality in education spending. However, the quantitative
results also produce some ﬁndings that are of interest and that are not nec-
essarily expected. For example, in the case of the lump-sum voucher, the
above results indicate that unless the size of the voucher exceeds the initial
spending for a substantial fraction of the population it has very small eﬀects
on total spending on education. To see this, consider the second row of the
first section, which corresponds to a voucher that is equal to 10 percent of av-
erage spending. This is seen not to have an eﬀect on education expenditures,
either by way of changing total expenditure or by changing inequality.
However, from table 6.1 we know that this voucher exceeds initial spending
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Table 6.2 First-Period Eﬀects on Education Spending
Size of Voucher Relative to Education Spending Education Tax Rate
Mean Educational Spending Relative to Total Income Inequality (%)
A. Lump-Sum Voucher System
0.00 0.0410 0.594 0.0
0.10 0.0410 0.592 0.4
0.25 0.0410 0.588 1.0
0.40 0.0412 0.577 1.6
0.50 0.0416 0.562 2.1
0.60 0.0423 0.541 2.5
0.75 0.0437 0.501 3.1
1.00 0.0474 0.421 4.1
B. Means-Tested Voucher System
0.00 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.10 0.0410 0.592 0.00
0.25 0.0410 0.588 0.01
0.40 0.0412 0.577 0.13
0.50 0.0416 0.562 0.33
0.60 0.0422 0.541 0.63
0.75 0.0436 0.501 1.24
1.00 0.0471 0.421 2.50
C. Means-Equalizing Voucher System
Equalizing Factor Relative Education Spending Education Tax Rate
to Mean Income Relative to Total Income Inequality (%)
0.00 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.10 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.25 0.0410 0.593 0.00
0.40 0.0411 0.590 0.02
0.50 0.0413 0.582 0.06
0.60 0.0416 0.572 0.13
0.75 0.0424 0.548 0.28
1.00 0.0441 0.504 0.64
1.25 0.0463 0.456 1.09for less than 2 percent of the households, and even for them it raises their
spending by relatively little on average. The basic message is that in order
for a lump-sum voucher (or a means-tested voucher) to have any sizable im-
pact, it must be of a magnitude that exceeds education spending for a sig-
niﬁcant fraction of the population. Otherwise it simply amounts to a small
program of income redistribution. A similar point holds in the case of the
means-equalizing voucher.
It is also of interest to draw a few comparisons across the three systems.
One point that the table makes quite clear is that the consequences of the
lump-sum voucher and the means-tested voucher are virtually identical for
education spending. The one diﬀerence between the two, not surprisingly,
is that the means-tested voucher requires a smaller tax to ﬁnance the sys-
tem. This is a pattern that will be repeated in the remainder of the results as
well. Two other important diﬀerences are that oﬀering a voucher equal to
the expenditure of, say, the mean-income household will reduce inequality
in spending by a much greater amount than will guaranteeing everyone a
tax base equal to mean income. The other is that the means-equalizing sys-
tem seems to provide a steeper drop in inequality per dollar of tax revenue
raised than does either of the other two systems.
In order to more fully appreciate the diﬀerent consequences of the three
systems for the distribution of educational expenditures, it is of interest to
look at these distributions in more detail. In table 6.3 we report average
spending on education by deciles of the income distribution for each of the
three systems.
In each section the ﬁrst column repeats the results without a voucher pro-
gram; thus, it simply describes the distribution of spending in the steady
state of the benchmark model. Reading across each section allows one to
examine how increasing the magnitude of a given voucher program aﬀects
spending at various deciles of the income distribution. A general pattern is
that as each voucher program becomes more generous, spending at the bot-
tom part of the income distribution increases, whereas spending at the
higher end of the distribution tends to decrease. However, the relative mag-
nitudes of these two changes are noteworthy. Whereas spending at the bot-
tom of the distribution may double or even triple as we move to the columns
at the far right of each section, the spending at the top of the distribution is
decreasing on the order of 1 percent. Hence, although each of the voucher
programs is decreasing inequality in spending by compressing the distribu-
tion of spending, this compression is almost entirely acting from below.
Next we compare the lump-sum voucher and the means-tested voucher.
We noted previously that both vouchers had virtually identical aggregate
eﬀects. If we look at the distributions more carefully, we see that the two
vouchers do produce some diﬀerences across the distribution but that these
eﬀects tend to roughly cancel in aggregate. For example, consider the case
of a voucher that is 75 percent of mean spending in the benchmark steady
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Table 6.3 First-Period Eﬀects on the Distribution of Education Spending
Size of Voucher Relative to Mean Spending
Decile 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.00
A. Lump-Sum Vouchers
1st 0.315 0.317 0.323 0.382 0.473 0.568 0.710 0.946
2nd 0.456 0.458 0.461 0.464 0.483 0.568 0.710 0.946
3rd 0.559 0.560 0.563 0.565 0.567 0.580 0.710 0.946
4th 0.656 0.658 0.659 0.661 0.662 0.664 0.710 0.946
5th 0.758 0.759 0.760 0.761 0.762 0.763 0.764 0.946
6th 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.946
7th 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.002
8th 1.181 1.180 1.178 1.177 1.176 1.175 1.174 1.171
9th 1.448 1.446 1.443 1.440 1.438 1.436 1.433 1.427
10th 2.196 2.191 2.183 2.176 2.171 2.165 2.158 2.145
B. Means-Tested Vouchers
1st 0.315 0.315 0.320 0.381 0.473 0.568 0.710 0.946
2nd 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.455 0.480 0.568 0.710 0.946
3rd 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.558 0.557 0.576 0.710 0.946
4th 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.654 0.652 0.710 0.946
5th 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.757 0.756 0.754 0.750 0.946
6th 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.869 0.868 0.865 0.860 0.946
7th 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.001 1.000 0.992 0.9832
8th 1.181 1.181 1.180 1.179 1.177 1.173 1.166 1.151
9th 1.447 1.447 1.448 1.446 1.443 1.439 1.430 1.412
10th 2.196 2.196 2.196 2.193 2.189 2.182 2.169 2.141
C. Means-Equalizing Vouchers
Equalizing Factor Relative to Mean Income
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.00 1.25
1st 0.315 0.315 0.317 0.345 0.386 0.424 0.475 0.549 0.612
2nd 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.468 0.510 0.572 0.661 0.737
3rd 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.558 0.567 0.631 0.729 0.814
4th 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.682 0.788 0.881
5th 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.757 0.756 0.845 0.944
6th 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.869 0.868 0.903 1.009
7th 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.003 1.001 0.998 1.081
8th 1.181 1.181 1.181 1.181 1.180 1.179 1.178 1.173 1.182
9th 1.447 1.447 1.447 1.447 1.447 1.446 1.444 1.439 1.432
10th 2.196 2.196 2.196 2.196 2.195 2.193 2.190 2.182 2.172
state: That is,  t    m   0.75   e. For the means-tested case this voucher is
available to the bottom 44 percent of households. In both cases the bottom
40 percent of the population spends only the amount of the voucher. How-
ever, note that the next decile spends more under the lump-sum voucher
than under the means-tested voucher. This reﬂects the fact that in themeans-tested case everyone with income above 75 percent of mean income
is receiving no voucher, and hence the only eﬀect on their education spend-
ing is due to the imposition of the income tax needed to ﬁnance the voucher.
In contrast, in the case of the lump-sum voucher, those households with in-
come slightly higher than 75 percent of mean income still receive a voucher
that is large relative to their spending in the benchmark model. This, of
course, must all be allocated to education. However, they still choose to sup-
plement this with a small amount of their own funds. They also face a larger
income tax, but for these families the eﬀect of the subsidy to education ex-
ceeds the eﬀect associated with the tax rate. However, as we move to higher
deciles in the income distribution we see that the relative spending levels are
reversed. For the highest decile, spending is greater under the means-tested
voucher than under the lump-sum voucher. The reason for this is that for
this group the voucher is relatively small compared to education spending
in the benchmark model, and the loss in income due to taxation is much
larger. Thus, the net eﬀect of the tax is much greater for this group. Since the
tax is much smaller under the means-tested program, they spend more un-
der this program.
Next we compare the means-tested voucher with the means-equalizing
voucher. The diﬀerences are more apparent for larger values of the voucher
programs, so once again we focus on the cases in which the means-tested
voucher is 75 percent of mean spending and the cutoﬀ level is 75 percent of
mean income. What is particularly striking is how diﬀerent the spending is
in the lower part of the distribution. For the lowest decile the means-tested
voucher yields spending on education that is more than one-third larger
than spending under the means-equalizing voucher. The reason for this
diﬀerence is that under the means-tested voucher these households are re-
ceiving a voucher in the amount of 0.071 that must be used for education.
In contrast, under the power-equalizing system these households are told
that they can raise money for education as if they had a tax base equal to 75
percent of mean income, but every dollar they devote to education reduces
their consumption. However, all families that have income above the 50th
percentile have greater spending under the power-equalizing system than
under the means-tested system. None of these households is eligible for a
voucher, so the diﬀerences are due entirely to the fact that the tax rate is
lower under the means-equalizing system. These two observations go hand
in hand: The reason that taxes are lower in the means-equalizing system is
that less money is being redistributed to low-income households to be used
for education. The key point that this table illustrates, however, is that the
largest diﬀerence between the two systems has to do with the diﬀerential ex-
tent to which the means-tested program will lift the spending of the lowest-
income households. The diﬀerence in levels of spending among the richer
households is in fact less than 1 percent.
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The results in the last section focused on what would happen to current
education spending as a result of introducing various voucher systems.
However, changes in the level or distribution of current education expendi-
tures will also have impacts on the future level and distribution of income.
In fact, one of the main motivations for public concern over the distribution
of education spending is that this spending plays a key role in the human
capital accumulation of children and thus in the future productive capacity
of the economy. In this section we focus on the long-run implications for the
distribution of income associated with the various voucher programs ana-
lyzed previously—that is, we look at the resulting steady-state distributions.
Table 6.4 provides the information.
As before, the ﬁrst column reports the size of the voucher system. The
next two columns report some properties of the steady-state income distri-
bution. The second column reports mean income, and the third column re-
ports the coeﬃcient of variation of income, which we will again use as our
measure of income inequality. The ﬁnal three columns present the same in-
formation that was presented in the previous subsection where we focused
on the static eﬀects on education spending. Once again, the ﬁrst row of each
section considers the case of no voucher and hence simply reproduces the
benchmark steady state.
Perhaps the most striking result to note here is the size of the potential in-
creases in income that are associated with some of the programs considered
above. A lump-sum voucher that was equal to average expenditures in the
benchmark steady state leads to an increase in income of roughly 10 per-
cent! A means-equalizing voucher that assisted everyone with income be-
low the mean would raise income by more than 6 percent. Note, moreover,
that the tax rate needed to support this voucher system is just slightly more
than one-half of 1 percent. These gains in income are large and point to the
potential gains to be obtained by a redistributive education ﬁnance system
even in a world where all individuals have access to schools that use re-
sources eﬃciently. We will show later that these large gains in income also
represent large gains in average welfare.
Considering the results in more detail, if education expenditures increase
and the inequality of those expenditures decreases, we would expect to see
that these two properties show up in the distribution of income as well. The
previous table reveals this to be the case. It is interesting to note, however,
that the magnitudes of these two eﬀects are quite diﬀerent. Consider, for ex-
ample, the two extreme cases represented in section A of table 6.3, one in
which the lump-sum voucher is zero and one in which the lump-sum voucher
is equal to mean spending on education in the benchmark steady state. In the
expenditure on education there is an increase of roughly 15 percent, and in
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is a decrease of roughly 33 percent. However, whereas the increase in mean
income is roughly 10 percent, the decrease in inequality in the income distri-
bution is only about 1.5 percent. The reason that inequality in the income
distribution decreases by so little relative to the decrease in inequality in the
education spending distribution is that diﬀerences in education spending ac-
count for very little of the variance in the income distribution. Most of the
variance is accounted for by the stochastic earnings term  . In fact, one can
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Table 6.4 Steady-State Implications of Vouchers
Size of Voucher Education
Relative to Mean Mean Income Spending Relative Education Tax
Education Spending Income Inequality to Total Income Inequality Rate
A. Lump-Sum Voucher
0.00 23.08 0.594 0.0410 0.594 0.0
0.10 23.09 0.594 0.0410 0.592 0.4
0.25 23.13 0.594 0.0410 0.587 1.0
0.40 23.32 0.591 0.0412 0.572 1.6
0.50 23.55 0.589 0.0416 0.554 2.0
0.60 23.84 0.587 0.0423 0.527 2.4
0.75 24.36 0.585 0.0437 0.480 2.9
1.00 25.29 0.583 0.0474 0.390 3.7
B. Means-Tested Voucher
0.00 23.08 0.594 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.10 23.08 0.594 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.25 23.11 0.594 0.0410 0.592 0.01
0.40 23.29 0.591 0.0412 0.580 0.13
0.50 23.52 0.589 0.0416 0.562 0.30
0.60 23.82 0.587 0.0422 0.534 0.56
0.75 24.34 0.585 0.0437 0.486 1.05
1.00 25.27 0.583 0.0471 0.393 2.03
C. Means-Equalizing Voucher
Equalizing Factor Education
Relative to  Mean Income Spending Relative Education Tax
Mean Income Income Inequality to Total Income Inequality Rate
0.00 23.08 0.594 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.10 23.08 0.594 0.0410 0.594 0.00
0.25 23.09 0.594 0.0410 0.593 0.00
0.40 23.18 0.593 0.0411 0.588 0.02
0.50 23.30 0.591 0.0413 0.578 0.06
0.60 23.46 0.590 0.0416 0.564 0.12
0.70 23.64 0.589 0.0421 0.547 0.20
0.75 23.73 0.588 0.0424 0.537 0.25
1.00 24.21 0.587 0.0441 0.486 0.56
1.25 24.68 0.585 0.0462 0.437 0.93ask what would happen to inequality in the income distribution even if in-
equality were completely removed from the education spending distribu-
tion. Holding mean spending constant, the resulting steady-state income
distribution would have a coeﬃcient of variation of 0.58.
It is also of interest to contrast the diﬀering ﬁscal requirements of these
voucher systems from the perspective of their implications for aggregate in-
come. Table 6.5 shows the long-run consequences in terms of percent in-
crease in aggregate income as a function of the initial (ﬁrst-period) ﬁscal re-
quirement also expressed as a percentage of aggregate income.
As can be seen, the diﬀerences are striking. Holding the ﬁscal require-
ment constant, the lump-sum voucher system produces substantially
smaller long-run increases in income as compared with the other two sys-
tems. The means-equalizing voucher system produces the largest increase
per dollar of tax revenue required.
Transition Eﬀects
What is the nature of the transition from the initial steady state to the ﬁ-
nal steady state? The transition turns out to be very fast—the economy
moves most of the way to the new steady-state income distribution one pe-
riod after the introduction of the voucher programs. Rather than present-
ing a long list of results for all of the various cases, we simply present one
case for each of the lump-sum and means-equalizing voucher systems (the
results for the means-tested voucher are similar to those for the lump-sum
voucher). For the lump-sum voucher we consider the case in which the
voucher is equal to mean spending on education, and for the means-
equalizing voucher we consider the case in which the equalizing factor is
mean income. Period 0 indicates the period in which the voucher is intro-
duced, so that in period 0 the income distribution corresponds to that of the
benchmark steady state. Table 6.6 reports the results for several of the vari-
ables considered above.
As already indicated, it is clear that most of the change in the income dis-
tribution actually occurs by period one. Subsequently there are relatively
minor increases in both mean income and mean educational expenditures
(note that even if education spending stays constant as a fraction of mean
income, mean income continues to increase), and minor decreases in in-
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Table 6.5 Long-Run Eﬀects of Given Expenditure Levels
% Increase in Long-Run Income
Required Revenue
(% of Total Income) Lump-Sum Means-Tested Means-Equalizing
0.25 0.00 1.60 2.60
0.50 0.04 2.69 4.07
1.00 0.21 4.55 6.54equality in both distributions. Given that mean income is increasing, re-
quired tax rates are decreasing over time.
6.4.2 Welfare
Having analyzed the eﬀects on allocations, we now analyze the welfare
eﬀects associated with these changes. In a model such as this, in which fam-
ilies are heterogeneous with regard to income and policies have diﬀerential
eﬀect on households, there is no deﬁnitive choice for a measure of welfare. If
some families are made better oﬀ while others are made worse oﬀ, then one
needs to take a stand on what weight to attach to each of the two groups. We
adopt as a welfare measure the expected utility of a family where the weight
on each type of family’s utility is its proportion in the population. This is
equivalent to a utilitarian welfare criterion: that is, one that puts equal
weight on all families. We then compute the extent to which the income dis-
tribution in the benchmark model would have to be scaled in order to equal-
ize welfare across the comparisons. We make this comparison for each of
several periods following the adoption of the various voucher programs.
We should expect that welfare comparisons at diﬀerent dates will look
quite diﬀerent because income is changing over time. In particular, given
that steady-state income is sometimes signiﬁcantly higher in the economy
with vouchers, we would expect welfare to also be substantially higher. Such
a comparison, of course, ignores the fact that in order to get the higher in-
come some redistribution was required (with a welfare cost for some). This
element is particularly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst period (period 0) because at
that point in time there has not been any increase in mean income and more
resources are being devoted to education. Of course, families do take into
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Table 6.6 Transition Paths
Mean Income Education Spending Education Tax
Period Income Inequality Relative to Total Income Inequality Rate
A. Lump-Sum Voucher Equal to Mean Education Spending
0 23.081 0.594 0.0474 0.421 4.10
1 25.166 0.582 0.0474 0.391 3.76
2 25.286 0.583 0.0474 0.390 3.74
3 25.294 0.583 0.0474 0.390 3.74
4 25.294 0.583 0.0474 0.390 3.74
5 25.294 0.583 0.0474 0.390 3.74
B. Means-Equalizing Voucher with Equalizing Factor Equal to Mean Income
0 23.081 0.594 0.0441 0.504 0.64
1 24.039 0.586 0.0441 0.489 0.57
2 24.190 0.586 0.0441 0.486 0.56
3 24.210 0.586 0.0441 0.486 0.56
4 24.212 0.586 0.0441 0.486 0.56
5 24.213 0.586 0.0441 0.486 0.56account the fact that their children will end up with higher incomes when
they assess the utility that they receive from a given voucher program.
Table 6.7 presents the welfare results.
In interpreting these numbers, note that a value of 1.020 for a particular
period, for example, indicates that income in the benchmark economy
would have to be scaled upward by 2 percent in order to make individuals
indiﬀerent between the steady state in the no-voucher world versus having
the allocation of resources be given to that in the world with a voucher in
the particular time period considered.
A striking ﬁnding is that welfare gains are positive in all periods for all
voucher plans considered (as indicated by the fact that all numbers are
equal to or greater than one). Moreover, the eﬀects are large; in several cases
the steady-state welfare gain exceeds 10 percent. As suggested above, it is in
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Table 6.7 Welfare Eﬀects
Voucher Relative to Initial Mean Education Spending
Period 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.00
A. Lump-Sum Voucher
0 1.006 1.014 1.020 1.023 1.024 1.023 1.019
1 1.007 1.018 1.036 1.051 1.067 1.094 1.137
2 1.007 1.019 1.037 1.053 1.071 1.098 1.142
3 1.007 1.019 1.038 1.054 1.072 1.099 1.142
4 1.007 1.019 1.038 1.054 1.072 1.099 1.142
5 1.007 1.019 1.038 1.054 1.072 1.099 1.142
B. Means-Tested Voucher
0 1.000 1.006 1.019 1.027 1.032 1.034 1.033
1 1.000 1.008 1.033 1.053 1.074 1.105 1.152
2 1.000 1.009 1.034 1.056 1.078 1.110 1.156
3 1.000 1.009 1.035 1.056 1.078 1.110 1.157
4 1.000 1.009 1.035 1.056 1.078 1.110 1.157
5 1.000 1.009 1.035 1.056 1.078 1.110 1.157
C. Means-Equalizing Voucher
Equalizing Factor Relative to Initial Mean Income
0.25 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.00 1.25
0 1.001 1.005 1.008 1.011 1.015 1.019 1.020
1 1.002 1.012 1.022 1.033 1.050 1.076 1.098
2 1.003 1.013 1.024 1.036 1.054 1.083 1.107
3 1.003 1.014 1.024 1.036 1.055 1.083 1.108
4 1.003 1.014 1.024 1.036 1.055 1.084 1.108
5 1.003 1.014 1.024 1.036 1.055 1.084 1.108fact the case that welfare gains in the initial period are quite a bit less than
the welfare gains associated with later periods. However, the size of the wel-
fare gain in the period following the introduction of the voucher is already
close to the steady-state welfare gain. Another ﬁnding of some interest is
that for the lump-sum voucher the size of the ﬁrst-period gain is not mono-
tone in the size of the voucher. For the values considered in the table it
reaches its maximum value for a lump-sum voucher equal to 60 percent of
mean spending. Steady-state welfare gains are monotone over the range of
voucher programs considered here.
6.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above are for one set of the model’s parameter val-
ues. To what extent are these results robust? We have carried out an exten-
sive sensitivity analysis of this issue. Rather than providing numerous addi-
tional tables, we attempt to summarize the main ﬁndings. In our calibration
we picked the preference parameter   to be equal to –1, although we stated
that the reasonable range was the interval [–2, 0]. It turns out that choosing
  to be some other value within this interval has very little eﬀect on the
quantitative results. We also calibrated the model so that educational ex-
penditures accounted for 4.1 percent of income in the benchmark model.
Changing this value within the interval of 3 percent to 5 percent had very
little eﬀect on the results.
One parameter value that does aﬀect the results in a signiﬁcant manner
is the educational production function parameter  . For the results above
we assumed   0.2. Recall that a larger value of  will imply that additional
educational resources have a larger eﬀect on future income. It should come
as no surprise that this parameter is important. For example, consider the
extreme case in which   0, which implies that educational resources do
not matter at all for income. In this case there is no issue of ineﬃciently low
investment by poor families because education ceases to be an investment.
Conversely, larger values of  imply that education oﬀers a higher rate of re-
turn and hence is more important as an investment. We ﬁnd, not surpris-
ingly, that the eﬀects of vouchers are increased as the value of  is increased.
Moreover, in terms of our income gains and welfare gains, we found that
these measures are roughly linear in  . Thus, if we were to decrease  to 0.1,
the income gains and welfare gains would be cut roughly in half, whereas if
we were to increase   to 0.3, these gains would be increased by 50 percent.
We note that if one considers a value of   0.1, for example, the implied
rate of return to education will be less than 5 percent, which lies below the
accepted range of estimates for this return.
It is also of interest to discuss an alternative model speciﬁcation. We have
assumed that there are no channels that generate intergenerational correla-
tions other than spending on education. In reality one may consider it likely
that other channels may also give rise to positive intergenerational correla-
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ability is partially heritable, then this may give rise to a correlation of the
random draws of   across generations. The main eﬀect of this modiﬁcation
is that it increases the desire of richer families to invest in their children’s ed-
ucation because it raises the rate of return to their education. Similarly, it
decreases the rate of return to investing in the education of children from
poorer families. However, it remains true that poor families tend to under-
invest in education relative to what is eﬃcient because of their inability to
borrow against the income of future generations. The new feature that this
adds to the analysis is that compressing spending at the top of the distribu-
tion becomes more costly, since these are the children with the highest rates
of return. Recalling, however, that in our simulations we found that vouch-
ers induced very little compression from above, we conclude that allowing
for some degree of ability to be heritable across generations is not likely to
have a large eﬀect on our ﬁndings.
6.5 Endogenous Choice of Vouchers
In the previous section we traced out the consequences of various
voucher programs for allocations and welfare in both the short and long
run. In tracing out these consequences, however, we have simply taken the
parameters of a given voucher system as exogenous. In reality, once a
voucher program is put in place, its parameters are likely to ultimately be
chosen through the political process. In view of this it is also important to
try and assess the likely outcome of the political process for the magnitude
of various voucher programs. This is the issue that we address in this sec-
tion.
Modeling the political process is of course a challenging endeavor. As is
common in the political economy literature, the benchmark that we adopt
for our study is that of majority voting. Hence, we will assume that all
households participate and are given equal weight in the process. In each
period, agents are assumed to choose the parameter that governs the size of
the voucher. The analytics of this problem for the lump-sum voucher and
the means-equalizing voucher have been studied previously by Fernández
and Rogerson (1999b).6 We refer the reader to that reference for analytical
details on the voting problem.
Here we focus on the outcomes that result from majority voting. In our
previous analysis we considered vouchers that were of constant value over
time. Once we endogenize the determination of the voucher, this will in gen-
eral not be the case, because changes in the income distribution over time
may lead to changes in the political outcome over time as well.
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6. That paper considers several school ﬁnance systems rather than voucher systems, but, as
discussed previously, there is a mapping between the two.We begin with the case of the lump-sum voucher. Results are presented in
table 6.8.
The table shows that in the initial period, majority vote leads to a voucher
whose value is a fraction 0.671 of average household education expenditure
in the benchmark steady state. The consequences of this for education ex-
penditures can be inferred from the earlier tables that indicate the conse-
quences of a given voucher. Hence, the results here lie somewhere between
those reported in table 6.2 for a lump-sum voucher of 60 and 75 percent of
mean spending. As before, we still ﬁnd that the transition to a steady state
is quite rapid. The one feature that could potentially be diﬀerent in this case
is that it could be that there are more dynamics introduced by the endoge-
nous choice of the voucher each period. In particular, the size of the voucher
increases over time, but otherwise these additional dynamics are not too
signiﬁcant quantitatively. Hence, the economy is most of the way to the new
steady state income distribution one period after the introduction of the
voucher. As the ﬁnal column indicates, there are substantial welfare gains
associated with the introduction of the voucher plan, both in the short run
and the long run. The long-run gain exceeds 9 percent when expressed rel-
ative to steady-state income in the benchmark economy.
Next consider the case of the means-tested voucher. The political econ-
omy of this system is more complicated than the other two systems. The rea-
son for this is that whereas the other two systems were completely summa-
rized by a single parameter, this system is summarized by two parameters.
As is well known in the social choice literature, two-dimensional problems
are much more diﬃcult. In considering the political economy of this system
we assume a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage the cutoﬀlevel ymis chosen,
and in the second stage the size of the voucher is chosen given the value of
ymchosen in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁnd that a majority voting equilibrium exists
and takes the form of having the cutoﬀ level ym being equal to median in-
come, so that half of the population receives the voucher. The size of the
voucher is then decided as the preferred choice of the lowest-income indi-
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Table 6.8 Endogenous Choice of Vouchers: Lump-Sum Vouchers
Size of Voucher Education
Relative to Mean Expenditure
Mean Tax Education Education Relative to
Period Income Rate Expenditure Inequality Total Income Welfare
0 23.081 2.75 0.671 0.523 0.0429 1.024
1 23.950 2.75 0.696 0.502 0.0431 1.080
2 24.142 2.75 0.702 0.496 0.0432 1.088
3 24.183 2.76 0.705 0.495 0.0432 1.090
4 24.202 2.76 0.706 0.495 0.0432 1.091
5 24.202 2.76 0.706 0.495 0.0432 1.091vidual. We take this individual to be someone with income of $1,000. This
turns out to generate a relatively small amount of redistribution. Results are
reported in table 6.9.
As the table indicates, the size of the voucher is relatively small—only 30
percent of average educational spending in the original steady state. As we
know from table 6.1, this voucher exceeds spending for only about 2 percent
of all households and, not surprisingly, has a fairly negligible eﬀect on the
economy.
Lastly, consider the case of the power-equalizing voucher. Table 6.10
presents the results.
An interesting ﬁnding here is that majority vote leads to a very high value
of the equalizing factor ye: As can be seen, this level is 1.44 times mean in-
come. As a result, this system brings about considerably more compression
in the distribution of education spending than does the lump-sum voucher
system. The increase in steady-state income is now almost 10 percent, and
the increase in steady state welfare exceeds 13 percent. Note that although
ye increases over time relative to initial mean income, it is actually quite
stable relative to mean income over time. As a result of the increase in ye, the
convergence to the new steady state is somewhat slower here than in the case
of exogenous policy considered earlier.
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Table 6.9 Endogenous Choice of Vouchers: Means-Tested Voucher
Size of Voucher Education
Relative to Mean Expenditure
Mean Tax Education Education Relative to
Period Income Rate Expenditure Inequality Total Income Welfare
0 23.081 0.62 0.299 0.593 0.0410 1.021
1 23.156 0.62 0.300 0.593 0.0410 1.028
2 23.179 0.62 0.300 0.593 0.0410 1.029
3 23.184 0.62 0.300 0.593 0.0410 1.030
4 23.185 0.62 0.300 0.593 0.0410 1.030
5 23.185 0.62 0.300 0.593 0.0410 1.030
Table 6.10 Endogenous Choice of Vouchers: Means-Equalizing Voucher
Equalizing Factor Education Expenditure
Mean Tax Relative to Education Relative to
Period Income Rate Mean Income Inequality Total Income Welfare
0 23.081 1.45 1.44 0.432 0.0481 1.019
1 24.755 1.45 1.55 0.394 0.0490 1.112
2 25.132 1.45 1.57 0.387 0.0492 1.129
3 25.208 1.45 1.57 0.385 0.0493 1.133
4 25.223 1.45 1.57 0.385 0.0493 1.133
5 25.226 1.45 1.57 0.384 0.0493 1.133It is interesting to note that the political economy of these three systems
is quite diﬀerent. We saw earlier that a means-tested voucher is able to in-
crease education spending among poorer households equally well as the
other two systems, given appropriate choice of program parameters. How-
ever, the striking ﬁnding in the foregoing analysis is that when choices are
made by a process of majority vote, poorer households end up with very
little increase in their spending on education relative to the other two sys-
tems.
Although this ﬁnding is signiﬁcant, it is important to note some qualiﬁ-
cations. Majority vote is one mechanism that can be used to generate a so-
lution to a social choice problem. Also, we have abstracted from some fea-
tures that may generate additional support for redistribution. For example,
we have assumed that greater education for poorer households has no ben-
eﬁts for other households. In reality, the additional skills accumulated by
these households may beneﬁt others as well.7 With this in mind, it is prob-
ably best to interpret our results as showing that political economy consid-
erations may imply that the three systems generate quite diﬀerent outcomes.
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